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Historiography
IN JANUARY 1711, Sarah Churchill, Duchess of Marlborough, was fired
as Groom of the Stole to Queen Anne, even though her husband, the
Duke, retained his position as commander of Queen’s forces. The friend-
ship between Sarah and the Queen had collapsed, and Anne had bestowed
her affections, as well as a position in the bedchamber, on Abigail
Masham, who happened to be a Tory. For Sarah, this replacement of
her Whig self by the Tory Masham was a political event. In her campaign
to retain her office, she used distinctions between “public” and “private”
in multiple ways. Sarah asserted that the bedchamber was a public
space, that she held public office in it, and that her presence there
served the public because she was a disinterested statesperson devoted
to the public good. Masham was a mere favourite, driven by private inter-
est, conjuring up private passion in the Queen. Sarah also conflated public
and private in certain ways. Anne’s bad behaviour, disloyalty to a friend,
and “passion” for Abigail Masham portended and invoked political
tyranny. Other people, though, insisted the dismissal of Sarah Churchill
was a purely personal event. The bedchamber, they argued, was Anne’s
private space to do with as she pleased. Contested definitions of public
and private were thus offered to advance political agendas. For Sarah, to
treat the dismissal as a political event was to legitimate herself as a political
actor. For Tories who defended Anne’s choice, the goal was to get Masham
into the bedchamber, which they thought would advance their party. For
Whigs other than Sarah, including Sarah’s husband, it made sense in
this one instance to agree with the Tories that the affair was indeed just
private because it let them deny that they were falling out of Anne’s
favour. Public and private as categories were deployed all the time in
the eighteenth century, yet meanings are contradictory, distinctions fluid.1
Feminist and other historians have long puzzled over the problem of
public and private in the course of the eighteenth century. It was once
common to say that, sometime in that period, public and private were sep-
arated and women relegated to the private sphere, but that narrative of
1 The story is told in Rachel Weil, Political Passions: Gender, the Family and Political Argument in
England 1680–1714 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), chap. 8; it is also discussed
by McKeon, The Secret History of Domesticity, pp. 562–565.
separation, and its gendering, has been questioned in recent scholarship.
We now know that women were up to their necks in financial transactions,
that the domestic dinner parties over which they innocently presided were
actually political cabals, and that Sarah Churchill thought she was a states-
woman and not a favourite. These insights and many others challenge the
idea that women were relegated to the private, or even that the public and
private ever split neatly apart.2 This complication of the previous narrative,
however, raises new questions. First, is it possible to construct a new
narrative about the meaning of public and private? Secondly, given that
categories of public and private were (as my opening anecdote suggests)
endlessly manipulated, conflated, and switched around, we still need to
explain why the terms were so important to people in the period.
McKeon’s book opens up interesting lines of thought on these questions.
Part I of McKeon’s book, “The Age of Separations,” makes what looks
like the conventional argument: the relationship of the public and private
changes from being one of “tacit distinction” to one of “explicit separ-
ation.” McKeon examines a large number of categorical dyads whose
relations were glossed in terms of “public” and “private” in this period:
state and family, marriage for interest and marriage for love, positive
liberty (“duty”) and negative liberty (“freedom”), sex as part of a social
matrix and sex as such, the political subject and the ethical subject, the pol-
itical public sphere and the aesthetic public sphere, particular (private)
and general (public), libel (an attack on a particular person, hence
private) and satire (an attack on a general vice, hence public).
“The Age of Separations,” however, is a somewhat misleading title for
the opening section. Much of McKeon’s discussion suggests that the
period was marked not by a simple division of things public from things
private, but by the instability of the labels public and private as they
were applied to particular experiences or phenomena. Take, for
example, the distinction between orality and literacy. One can argue that
“literacy” is more public in that the written word reaches a wider, less
personal audience. However, the written word also has connotations of
“privacy”: it can be read in the closet, be a better vehicle for the communi-
cation of “innermost thoughts,” and allow for a more personal communi-
cation of author and reader than can a speech or sermon. In McKeon’s
account, the “public” term of one dyad can become the “private” term
of another. A good example of this phenomenon is the term “economic.”
The “economic” was classically seen as the opposite of the “political,”
2 For the above points, see, among others, Elaine Chalus, “Elite Women, Social Politics, and the Political
World of Late 18th-century England,” Historical Journal, vol. 43, no. 3 (2000), pp. 669–697; Margaret
R. Hunt, The Middling Sort: Commerce, Gender, and the Family in England, 1680–1780 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1996); Amanda Vickery, The Gentleman’s Daughter: Women’s Lives
in Georgian England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Weil, Political Passions.
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aligned with base bodily needs, the private, and family. In more recent
times, however, the “economic” has been aligned with the rough, rude
world outside the household, and hence with the public.
Moreover, McKeon argues that the drawing of a line separating two
terms on a public/private axis was always accompanied by a replication
of the division within the “private” side of the term. The well-known
mapping of family/state onto private/public was thus, McKeon compel-
lingly shows, subject to further refinements. Although the family was con-
sidered “private” in relation to the state, McKeon demonstrates that
state-like relations of power and force were soon seen to appear inside
the family, associated with the power of parent over child; these state-
like aspects of the family were then contrasted with the more freely
chosen and intimate (hence “private”) relations of husband with wife.
The conjugal relationship, as opposed to the parent/child relationship,
thus came to be understood as the truly “private” relationship within
the family. This alignment of conjugal with private and parent-child with
public was further complicated by the perception that there were different
kinds of marriages (marriages for money versus marriages for love)
and different kinds of husbands (tyrants versus companions) and that
these distinctions too could be mapped onto a public/private dichotomy.
The notion that inside every “private” there can be found a new public
and private connects the first part of McKeon’s book — a very broad
socio-cultural-intellectual-political survey — to the second and third,
which are concerned with the genealogy of literary forms. The end point
of the story is the birth of the “domestic novel,” in which what has been
formerly seen as “public” is incorporated entirely inside the “private,”
so that it becomes possible to see the world, if not in a grain of sand, at
least in the daily round of family life. For McKeon, the domestic novel
is a result, perhaps unintended, of the formal practice of “domestication,”
a technique for teaching or understanding high things (God, politics) by
way of low, common things. An allegory like the Pilgrim’s Progress
would be an example of formal domestication; so is the roman a` clef, in
which a story of love stands in for and reveals a story of politics. In all
of these, that which is small, unimportant, common, and private is the sig-
nifier, while the big thing (God, the state) is the signified and is, of course,
what we really want to know about. McKeon argues that over time writers
who undertook to use domestication as a formal strategy got more inter-
ested in the signifier than the signified. Eventually, they ceased to need
to justify their writing about the low, humble, and “domestic” by pretend-
ing it was about something more important than “private life.” But private
life came to contain all the ethical and political possibilities that “politics”
as a subject used to contain. As McKeon puts it, “The rich lode of dom-
esticity that is deposited by the slow withdrawal of domestication over
the course of the early modern period has at its core a conviction of the
adequacy of the private to sustain and entail those ultimate human ends
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to which it had seemed until then no more than a hermeneutic and
pedagogic means” (p. 715).
The Secret History of Domesticity accordingly ends with a reading of
Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, through which McKeon seems to
offer a wider defence of the “domestic novel” as a serious ethical and pol-
itical project. Pride and Prejudice, he insists, is not political in the sense of
supporting Jacobins or Conservatives, but it does explore issues of positive
and negative freedom in the way, for example, that it sets up but then com-
plicates the apparent difference between marriage for duty and marriage
for love or between aristocratic and meritocratic notions of worth.
Moreover, McKeon links Austen to the Adam Smith of Theory of Moral
Sentiments, in that Pride and Prejudice takes on the problem of how an
individual comes to reconcile public and private by internalizing the per-
spective of “the other” or of society as a whole. “Like Adam Smith,”
McKeon writes, “Austen would have us understand that both self-
knowledge and ethical sociability require the internalization of the
other’s point of view as if it were one’s own” (p. 717).
McKeon thus puts Adam Smith, Jane Austen, and the “domestic novel”
into the context of a rich body of eighteenth-century ethics, aesthetics, and
social psychology that is all concerned with how an individual might be
expected to attain the perspective of disinterestedness or objectivity.
This body of thought in turn emerged, he suggests, because of two political
developments. First, as a result of the seventeenth-century revolutions,
political authority devolved from the monarch to something called “the
public.” Secondly, ideals of negative liberty (meaning personal freedom,
including freedom to pursue self-interest) emerged strongly in this
period. The attractions of “negative liberty” meant that the question
inevitably raised by the devolution of authority onto “the public” —
namely, “what does the public want?” — could not be answered by
recourse to a Rousseauian notion of the “general will.” Nor could it be
answered, as Mark Knights has recently shown, by equating “the public”
with Parliament or voters.3 Nor, contrary to well-known claims by
J. G. A. Pocock and Steven Shapin, could it be answered by deciding
that a certain socio-economic group (landed gentlemen) was alone
capable of disinterested objectivity and virtuous public-mindedness.4
Instead, McKeon insists, it had to be acknowledged that the “public”
was constituted by “diverse actual particularities” — that is, real people
3 Mark Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain: Partisanship and Political
Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
4 Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-century England
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History:
Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985).
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or at least real groups of people who were not all the same. How to
conceive of those people as “a public” was the problem that everyone
wanted to solve, and eighteenth-century attempts to do so tended to
focus on the development of the individual, the cultivation of individuals
who could at once be “free” and yet internalize a perspective that
transcended their particular interest.
One of McKeon’s most valuable contributions, I think, is to put issues of
domesticity and privacy that gender historians tend to think of as being
about gender into a wider political and historical context. It is healthy
and challenging to be reminded that the categories of public and private
did not, or not just, come into being as weapons in a class or gender-
political struggle. They did not exist solely to confine women to the house-
hold, or to expel women and the working class from the public sphere, or
so that Whigs could avoid extending the egalitarian implications of con-
tract theory into the family, or to let the middle class separate itself
from the working class (by setting up a definition of legitimate privacy
that the latter was unable to attain). The public/private distinction
was used to all those ends, of course, but we cannot understand why the
distinction was compelling unless we see how it grew from and played
out in the context of a larger problem of politics and ethics.
Nonetheless, aspects of McKeon’s approach to the problem of public
and private raise concerns for me, and I offer them here as an invitation
to further dialogue. First, historians (and not just feminist historians)
may wonder whether McKeon risks evacuating questions of power,
gender, and society. Causality and agency are elusive in McKeon’s
account. It is striking that some of his most compelling sentences have sub-
jects that are not human beings but abstractions. A case in point is the sen-
tence quoted above regarding the “rich lode of domesticity that is
deposited by the slow withdrawal of domestication.” This turns on a
very visualizable geological image. In fact, much of what McKeon says
in this book can be very easily visualized, often in terms of images
drawn from the natural sciences. His account of the splitting up and
then re-splitting and recombining of the private and public, for example,
calls to my mind images of cell division and embryonic development.
This raises questions for me about the mode of persuasion — does visua-
lizability substitute for explanation here? In any case, I am not sure in the
end how McKeon would explain the recession of domestication or
the endless process of splitting and re-splitting that affects public and
private. Similarly, I am not sure how McKeon would account for what
he repeatedly offers as his central narrative of modernity, the movement
of thought from the making of “tacit distinctions” to the making of
“explicit separations,” unless the agent is thought itself.
The absence of identifiable agents is especially problematic because the
history of the public/private distinction is so deeply connected to the
history of power. The act of labelling something as public or private is
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deeply political, because these terms have defined access and legitimacy.
To know what is public and what is private is to know who can say what
about what, who can pry into who else’s business, where legal action
would be appropriate and where not. Speech or knowledge that crosses
the boundary, mixes the categories, is deemed scandalous and hence not
legitimate. Therefore, power resides in control of the definitions of
public and private. That was the point about the story of Sarah
Churchill: everyone involved decided whether the Queen’s bedchamber
or the Queen’s friendship was a public or private matter in accordance
with political needs. This is, admittedly, an instrumental interpretation of
how public and private were defined in that particular context, but it
has the virtue of having agents, people who make and apply the labels
for a reason.
If the labelling of things as public and private carries with it a politics, so
too does “domesticity.” A final question for McKeon, and for cultural his-
torians more generally, turns on the relationship of the domestic novel (of
which McKeon offers a powerful defence) and domesticity, understood in
terms of the legal, educational, ideological, economic structures that limit
women’s concerns to the home. If Edward Said was wrong, as McKeon
argues, to condemn Jane Austen as lacking an ethical/political engage-
ment with the wider world, does that mean that Mary Wollstonecraft
was wrong in condemning the narrowness of the education and life
course open to middle-class women?
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